【报告主题】The Effect of Lead Lenders’Equity Holding on Co-Lead Syndicate Structure
【主讲嘉宾】康涅狄格大学 宫国瑾
【报告时间】2021年4月20日 9：00
【参与方式】线上
【内容提要】In syndicated lending, lead lenders choose to involve co-lead lenders to share administrative and monitoring tasks. We proposed that the co-lead syndicate structure potentially mitigates agency problems between lead lenders and participant lenders. As lead lenders’ simultaneous holding of borrowers’ equity (hereafter, dual holding) exacerbates information asymmetry and incentive conflicts between lead lenders and participant lenders, lead lenders with dual holding are more likely to invite co-lead lenders to mitigate concerns from participant lenders and facilitate loan syndication. Empirical findings are consistent with this conjecture and are unlikely explained by the endogeneity of lead lenders’ dual holding position. The positive association between lead lenders’ dual holding and the likelihood of co-lead syndicate structure is more pronounced when participant lenders are more concerned about lead lenders’ opportunistic activities and borrowers’ creditworthiness. Path analyses show that lead lenders’ dual holding reduces the likelihood of loan covenant violation through the co-lead syndicate structure. Interestingly, dual holding does not affect the proportion of loans taken by lead lenders, suggesting that co-lead syndicate structure and loan share serve as distinctive mechanisms to address agency problems in syndicated lending.