【讲座时间】2025年7月8日 14:00
【讲座地点】会计学院206室
【讲座主题】The Reluctance to Record Audit Adjustments in SOEs:The Role of Managerial Incentives in Shaping Audit Practices
【嘉宾介绍】陈华予，美国洛约拉马利蒙特大学（Loyola Marymount University）会计学助理教授
美国洛约拉马利蒙特大学（Loyola Marymount University）会计学助理教授，亚利桑那大学会计学博士。她的主要研究兴趣包括事务所内部控制及人力资本管理对审计师行为和审计质量的影响、审计对企业披露决策的影响等。陈教授的研究成果发表于Journal of Accounting Research、Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory等国际顶级会计期刊，并于2022年获得美国会计学会年会审计分会的最佳实证论文奖。此外，她还担任了多家国际顶级期刊的匿名审稿人。
【内容提要】
This study investigates whether and how managerial incentives in State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) influence the recording of audit adjustments. Using data on audit engagements of publicly traded firms in China from 2006 to 2017, we find that SOEs are significantly more likely than non-SOEs to avoid recording audit adjustments. Consistent with the notion that SOE managers face strong pressures to demonstrate regulatory compliance and that audit adjustments may signal noncompliance and deficiencies in financial reporting and internal oversight, we show that recorded audit adjustments reduce SOE CEOs’ promotion prospects. The tendency to avoid audit adjustments is more pronounced when SOEs are led by CEOs nearing the end of their careers who have stronger incentives to secure a final promotion, and when they are subject to more stringent oversight by the central government. We also find that SOEs are more likely to have no recorded audit adjustments when auditor turnover risk is high, suggesting that auditors have incentive to accommodate management needs to retain SOE clients. Furthermore, we find that SOE audits with no recorded adjustments are associated with higher audit fees and longer onsite audit time, suggesting that auditors invest effort to resolve issues preemptively. Finally, we find that SOE audits with no recorded adjustments have higher discretionary accruals and higher likelihood to issue error-related restatements, indicating that the avoidance of adjustments can undermine audit quality. Overall, our findings underscore the role of managerial incentives in shaping audit practices.
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