【讲座时间】2025年10月14日 14:00
【讲座地点】会计学院106室
【讲座主题】Does Restricting Managers’ Discretion through Accounting Standards Improve Performance Measures Used in Compensation Contracts?
【嘉宾介绍】程林，中欧国际商学院
程林教授，2012年毕业于美国俄亥俄州立大学并获得会计学及管理信息系统博士学位。在加入中欧国际工商学院之前，曾任教于美国亚利桑那大学Eller商学院，担任副教授并获终身教职。他曾于2018年在德国WHU–Otto Beisheim管理学院，2019年在清华大学和上海财经大学担任客座教授。
程林教授的研究领域主要集中在公司信息披露、债务契约、劳动经济学和审计学。他的多篇论文发表于The Accounting Review、Contemporary Accounting Research、Journal of Accounting and Economics等国际顶级学术期刊。他曾受邀在北京大学、清华大学、新加坡国立大学、香港大学、荷兰蒂尔堡大学、加拿大多伦多大学、美国纽约大学等亚洲和国际一流大学进行演讲分享学术研究成果。按照近六年的学术成果，程林教授在2022年BYU(杨百翰大学)会计学者排名中实证财务会计领域个人排名世界37位、综合领域整体个人排名世界118位。程林教授于2023年获得中欧国际工商学院优秀研究奖。
程林教授的教学与实践经验丰富，在加入中欧国际工商学院之前，他曾在美国亚利桑那大学、俄亥俄州立大学和清华大学为本科、研究生和博士生教授财务会计相关课程。程林教授现任Contemporary Accounting Research编辑委员会成员，并担任The Accounting Review、Contemporary Accounting Research、Review of Accounting Studies、Management Science、Review of Financial Studies等国际顶级期刊的特约审稿人。同时，程林教授在国内多家上市与非上市公司担任独立董事。
【内容提要】
Prior literature consistently finds that restricting managers’ discretion within GAAP-based financial statements most often prevents managers from conveying information, resulting in less useful metrics, notwithstanding theoretical benefits from limiting opportunism. We examine a setting where the opportunism-limiting benefits of restricting managers’ discretion are likely to be maximized relative to other settings—compensation contracts. We find that adjustments to contractual metrics are more likely when GAAP is more restrictive, even when managers have the highest observed levels of incentive to increase earnings. Further, adjustments made when GAAP is more restrictive do not seem to be opportunistic in that they (1) do not increase compensation levels or the likelihood of achieving bonus thresholds and (2) have no predictive value for future performance. In contrast, we find that adjustments that are less likely to be a result of GAAP being restrictive do bear the telltale signs of opportunistic adjustments — greater compensation and likelihood of achieving bonus thresholds and predictive value for future performance. Overall, our evidence suggests that GAAP earnings is less useful in compensation contracts when GAAP is restrictive and that adjustments made under restrictive GAAP do not seem to be opportunistic.
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