【讲座时间】2026年5月19日 14:00
【讲座地点】会计学院108室
【讲座主题】
The Value of Government Data Collection:Evidence from Central Bank Digital Currency and Corporate Patenting
【嘉宾介绍】Ying Gan，Erasmus School of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands
My name is Ying Gan, and I am an Associate Professor of Financial Accounting at Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands. I received my PhD in Finance at WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management, Germany. I received additional training from HEC Paris and from the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. My research interests are in financial reporting quality, CEO incentive plan design choices and CEO succession planning.
【内容提要】
We provide early evidence on the SEC’s most recent compensation reform—the Pay Versus Performance (PvP) disclosure rules. Using a sample of 652 U.S. public firms, our analysis shows that 97% of firms select accounting-based metrics as their firm-specific PvP measure - defined as the firm’s self-selected ‘most important’metric for executive pay. Over half align their PvP measure with annual bonus-plan metrics, and most do so consistently over time, indicating that opportunistic “metric shopping’ is less prevalent. Firms that exceed their PvP performance targets demonstrate substantial improvements in shareholder value creation, proxied by total shareholder return, share return, and market value. Moreover, we show that the new disclosure of Compensation Actually Paid (CAP), which adjusts reported total pay to incorporate annual changes in the fair value of equity awards, consistently exhibits far greater sensitivity to firm performance compared to total compensation, lending support to the SEC’s disclosure framework. By documenting the economic relevance of CAP and PvP measures, our findings highlight how the SEC’s disclosure reform improves the ability of investors and regulators to assess the pay–performance sensitivity of CEO compensation.
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